The process of religion “revival” in Tajikistan had become one of the reasons for the civil war (1992-1997). The demands of democracy and political freedom were closely related to the idea of freedom of religion, and radical forces also wanted to change the secular structure of Tajikistan. The search for compromises were successful only after years of hostilities, and the ceasefire rules provided for armed Islamic militants to put down weapons, in exchange for various positions in government and seats in parliament.
In Central Asia, an increase in Islam’s significance has been observed; specifically, after the collapse of the USSR, when the new countries were seeking a new ideology to unite their nations. Historically, the countries of the region were linked to Muslim culture (especially Uzbekistan), and people had retained their religiosity. As a consequence, Central Asia is a “mellow soil” for the activities of various Islamic movements, groupings and other organizations, that search for and want to attract new supporters.
According to Russia's federal budget for 2019-2020, national defence spending in 2019 is projected to be 2.9 trillion RUB (44.7 billion USD), or 16.2% of total budget expenditure (2.8% of GDP). In nominal terms, expenditure will increase by 145.4 billion RUB, or 3.1% compared to 2018. In 2020, defence spending will be 3 trillion RUB (46.5 billion USD), or 16.3% of total budget expenditure (2.7% of GDP), and RUB 3.1 trillion (48.3 billion USD) in 2021 or 16.6% of budget expenditure (2.7% of GDP).
The Russian federal budget is a key element of the Russian budget system. The federal budget is drawn up by the government and adopted by parliament as a federal law. The budget code of the Russian Federation regulates the procedure of budgeting and execution. The federal budget is a large part of the distribution process, which manifests itself in the redistribution of funds between sectors of the economy and regions of the country.
In the late 1980s, the USSR State Security Committee (SSC or KGB) developed the socalled “Operational investigation system” («Система оперативно-розыскных мероприятий») or SORM, whose various versions continue to operate today. SORM-1 is designed for listening to telephone lines and mobile communications, SORM-2 for monitoring Internet traffic, and upcoming SORM-3 for gathering information from all types of communications, storing this information in the long term, and providing access to all subscriber data.
According to a survey conducted by the Russian Sociological Research Centre “Levada-Centr” in October 2018, with 1,600 respondents aged 18 and over, 76% of the population use the Internet in Russia as a whole (from “daily” to “less than once a week”) but 57% use the Internet every day.
Since its inception in 1992, the Russian AF has mainly operated in the territory of Russia and its neighboring countries. Russian AF personnel has been involved in UN authorized peacekeeping missions such as Bosnia, but the extent of this involvement was not significant and limited to the use of Land Forces (LF) and helicopters. That is why Russian military intervention in Syria, which was officially launched on 30 September 2015, was the first major Russian military operation outside the post-Soviet space.
The reformed Russian Corps of Officers of the AF demonstrated their capabilities in February 2014 when it planned and implemented a military operation during which Crimea was occupied. By using the available resources skillfully, the Russian AF, in a short time without loss of military personnel, took over the strategic objects on the peninsula and disarmed Ukraine's AF, which one month later allowed Moscow to implement the annexation of Crimea.
In 2008, in response to the Russian Armed Forces’ (AF) weak performance in the war against Georgia, the then Defense Minister Anatoly Serdyukov, along with AF General Staff (GS) Chief of Army-General Nikolai Makarov, launched the AF reform with the aim of creating a modern, professional AF capable of responding to modern dynamic challenges. The reform was to be implemented in three stages. The first stage included the optimization of troops, the creation of a new command structure, and military education reform.
Detailed, publicly available information on “Rosgvardia”'s armament, like its substructures and their activities, is scattered and provides only a general insight. Similarly, the information on website about purchases and armament supply is rather fragmentary.
Russian military structures have traditionally retained the culture of clashes of distrust and sharp competition still existing in the Soviet Union, which is particularly expressed among the special services, and is manifested in disrupting the operations of competing structures, indirectly neglecting activities, spying on them, turning against employees of the other structure, etc. Despite the fact that “Rosgvardia” is entering this landscape as a new creation, its rapid development, which is mainly due to the support of the regime, has provided it with an equal, if not superior, place among the Russian military structures.
In 1991, in fact, immediately after the August Putsch, Boris Yeltsin, the President of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic, instructed Vice-President Alexander Rutskoi to launch the formation of a “Russian Guard” aimed at protecting the “democratic achievements of the RSFSR multinational people” and the constitutional order of the reactionary forces.