After the collapse of the USSR, the problem of “Dedovshchina” in Russia was only exacerbated by the unstable and bad economic conditions of the 1990s. In the background of these events the Russian officer class particularly suffered, and the number actually declined in the 1990s, mainly due to extremely low wages.
The term “Dedovshchina” in the Russian and Post-Soviet space refers to a form of social relations in the armed forces within which senior conscript soldiers commit physical and psychological violence against recruits. “Dedovshchina” also encompasses a non-regulated hierarchy, as well as various “customs” and “rituals” that actually discriminate against and exploit soldiers in the latest conscript military service.
Implementation of NAP-2027 could trigger the consequences of an unresolved problem in the Russian military industry, warns experts from the Centre for Strategy and Technology Analysis in the report “NAP-2027 implementation risks associated with shortage of modern construction materials”.
The Russian National Armament Programme (NAP) is a medium-term planning document that provides for the development of the Russian Armed Forces (AF) based on an analysis and assessment of potential threats to Russian national security. The development of the NAP is coordinated by the Russian Ministry of Defence (MD), which also involves other ministries and force structures and companies of the Military Industrial Complex (MIC).
In Uzbekistan, nuclear power plant construction in cooperation with Russia will start in the nearest future – a proper agreement was reached in December 2017, but in October 2018, during a visit of Russia’s President Vladimir Putin to Tashkent, a symbolic start was given to begin engineering research for the search of the most suitable area for nuclear power plant construction. It is planned to be built near the Lake Tuzkan (Jizzakh District, northeast of the country) in cooperation with Russian corporation Rosatom and will include two power units. The cost of the project is estimated at $ 11 billion.
Uzbekistan's ambitions in the nuclear sector are mainly related to the need for economic development in the country – the electricity it generates will allow to stimulate production expansion, create new workplaces and supplement the budget with funds generated by the export of "surplus" energy generated from other sources. In addition, joining the "nuclear club" will contribute to the consolidation of Uzbekistan in the region. The Topos Nuclear Power Plant will be the first in Central Asia. Kazakhstan also had plans to build its own nuclear power plant, as the republic has the world's second-largest uranium deposits and the largest extraction, but so far the solution this issue has been postponed.
Natural gas supplies to Russia were interrupted in early 2016 following a protracted conflict between the Russian and Turkmen state-owned Gazprom and Turkmen gas companies over remittance. Gazprom sought price revision from 2008 and reduced natural gas purchases in Turkmenistan to one billion cubic meters in 2015 (as compared with the previous 10 billion cubic meters of natural gas per year; it should be noted that by 2009 the amount of Russian purchases was 40 billion cubic meters per year).
The 10th International Natural Gas Congress TGC-2019 was held on May 21 and 22 this year in the Avaza tourist region (West Turkmenistan) with the aim to develop cooperation in the field of energy usage, as well as to inform about priorities of the Turkmen energy strategy and projects for diversification and modernization of natural gas exports.
The primacy of modern-day Russian Armed Forces can actually be attributed to the military doctrine adopted in November 1993, which incorporated the idea of modernizing the army. In practice, however, in the 1990s the Russian army relied on Soviet structures, full of severe economic problems and corruption. Beginning with the reforms of the Minister of Defense Sergei Ivanov in 2001, the Russian Armed Forces began moving towards the introduction of a contract service.
Beginning already in the 1970s, known as the period of stagnation in the context of the Soviet economy, the USSR was experiencing a burgeoning crisis of Marxist Leninist ideology, manifesting itself in the inadequacy of Bolshevik basic principles to address everyday realities, increasing corruption in all spheres of the country, as well as a technological gap compared to the Western countries. With the liberalization of the USSR economy in the mid-1980s, a rapid demise of the socialist bloc began, resulting in the collapse of the communist regimes in Eastern Europe. In the case of Russia, until the mid-1990s, the new power followed a liberal and pro-Western political course.
The political “rebirth” of A. Navalny was in 2011, when a mass protest movement against the falsification of the results of the State Duma elections began in Russia. Back in early 2011 (the elections were held in December), an oppositionist on radio broadcast made the famous and widely circulated phrase that “Edinaya Rossiya” is a party of fraudsters and thieves.
Lawyer and public activist Alexei Navalny was born in 1976 in the Moscow region. In 1998, he graduated from the Law Faculty People's Friendship University of Russia and in 2001 from the Finance Academy under the Russian Government, specializing in securities and stock exchange transactions. In 2010, following the suggestion of a number of public activists Garry Kasparov, Yevgeny Albaca and others, A. Navalny studied for a semester at Yale University as part of the “Yale World Fellows” program.